The professionals' perspective on the causes of project delay in the construction industry

Purpose: Construction project delays are described as a universal problem, which has led to many empirical studies. However, most of these studies were based on the rankings by respondents, and they were rarely verified. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to explore professional perspectives on the causes of delay in the construction industry, where there has been little explicit consideration on this subject in recent decades. Design/methodology/approach: A critical literature review and a qualitative approach was considered for a deeper and fresh understanding of the causes of delays, rather than recycling the existing themes and the risk of a statistically biased approach. A total of 41 interviews were undertaken which included the London Olympic 2012 project team. Findings: In all, 32 themes were identified, which were categorised into 15 categories of causes of delay in the construction projects. Almost two-thirds of the main themes are not ranked top 15 causes of delay. These include knowledge and competence shortage, poor commercial decisions, unnecessary health and safety restrictions, poor risk management and poor space and logistics management. Research limitations/implications: Due to the qualitative nature of the study, the findings might not be considered as representative. Practical implications: The findings provide consideration of the causes of delay in the construction industry as seen by practitioners, which should provide guidance to enhance performance. Originality/value: The study contributes to the better understanding of the causes of delays by using qualitative research strategy which is limited in the construction management literature. This study is an empirical investigation into the causes of delay in the twenty-first century and it represents an important edition to the body of knowledge within the subject area

The ethanol production grants program

This audit examined the effectiveness of the administration of the Ethanol Production Grants Program (EPGP). Objective, criteria and scope The objective of the audit was to examine the effectiveness of Industry’s administration of the EPGP, including relevant advice on policy development. To form a conclusion against the objective, the following high level audit criteria were used: the grant application process was accessible and attracted high quality applications; the assessment process adopted was consistent, transparent and cost effective; advice to the delegate was complete and robust and funding decisions were sound; funding distribution is consistent with the program’s objectives and appropriate arrangements are in place to manage successful projects; appropriate monitoring and reporting arrangements are in place; and relevant government entities provided sound advice to assist with policy development and government decision making. The ANAO examined program administration since 2007–08, given the difficulty in identifying and locating detailed records relating to the program’s early administration. However, the ANAO’s examination of the policy development process and decisions by government covers the period from the EPGP’s establishment in 2002. The ANAO does not have a role in commenting on the merits of government policy. This audit does not involve an assessment of the administration of other (non-EPGP) government initiatives to support the Australian ethanol industry, except to the extent necessary for an understanding of the history of the EPGP. Methodology In conducting the audit, the ANAO reviewed: documents of the departments of Industry and Science, the Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Treasury and Finance, including policy documents, ministerial correspondence, reports, guidelines and operational documents; examined relevant Cabinet submissions, memoranda and decisions; interviewed departmental staff; and examined the grants administration process. The ANAO also invited EPGP recipients to provide representations about their experience as grant recipients and, in particular, Industry’s administration of the program; however, no submissions were received. Overall conclusion Originally introduced in 2002-03 as a short term (12 month) subsidy payable to eligible domestic ethanol producers, the Ethanol Production Grants Program (EPGP) was extended by successive Australian Governments and will end on 30 June 2015 at a cost to the Commonwealth of some 895 million over the program’s life. The key program objective was to support the production and deployment of ethanol produced from locally derived feedstocks as a sustainable transport fuel in Australia. Intended outcomes were to: improve the long term viability of the ethanol industry in Australia; increase the capacity of the ethanol industry to supply the transport fuel market; and encourage the use of environmentally sustainable fuel ethanol as an alternative transport fuel in Australia. Five program participants have received financial assistance under the EPGP, which is a grants program currently administered by Industry. Overall, Industry\u27s administration of the EPGP since 2007-08, the period examined in this performance audit, has been generally effective. EPGP program arrangements were generally fit for purpose and largely consistent with the Australian Government\u27s grants administration framework. The department also implemented a sound arrangement for monitoring grant recipients\u27 compliance with key program requirements. Had the program continued beyond its planned closure in 2014-15, there would have been opportunities for the department to improve its public performance reporting on achievement against the program’s objectives and outcomes, which is currently limited to reporting on the number of companies that receive payments under the program. The Australian Government\u27s recent decision to close the EPGP was informed by a consistent body of analysis and advice—provided to successive governments since the program\u27s earliest days—drawing attention to shortcomings in the overall policy approach and the likelihood that program costs would exceed benefits. Prior to the EPGP\u27s establishment and at key decision points, the administering department and central co-ordinating agencies offered candid advice on value for money, drawing on past Australian and international experience and the findings of two key reviews (in 2008 and 2014) which had concluded that the benefits of the program were modest and had come at a high cost. These assessments of value for money are underlined by the program\u27s limited success in achieving key objectives and outcomes. After 12 years of operation and some 895 million in government support directed towards improving the long-term viability of the domestic ethanol industry, in 2014 only three domestic producers (up from two in 2002) were operating, and an expanded Australian ethanol industry based on market priced feedstock was considered unlikely to be commercially viable in the absence of the EPG rebate. The ANAO has not made recommendations in this audit, as the EPGP is scheduled to close from 30 June 2015. While there was scope for the administering departments to develop a more effective performance reporting framework as a basis for assessing outcomes, Industry and the central agencies did provide candid advice to government on the modest performance of the program against its objectives, drawing on Australian and international experience and two reviews of the program; with decisions to continue the program until 2014–15 made by successive governments

Administration of the Early Years Quality Fund

This audit assessed the effectiveness of the establishment, implementation and operation of the Early Years Quality Fund against the requirements of the Early Years Quality Fund Special Account Act 2013 and the Commonwealth grants administration framework. Audit objective, criteria and scope The audit objective was to assess the effectiveness of the establishment, implementation and operation of the EYQF against the requirements of the Early Years Quality Fund Special Account Act 2013 and the Commonwealth grants administration framework. To conclude against the audit objective, the high level criteria included whether the program planning and implementation complied with the legal framework, appropriately considered risks and was consistent with the EYQF policy intent, and the grant selection processes were undertaken in an equitable and transparent way consistent with relevant legislation and the Commonwealth Grant Guidelines. The EYQF was implemented by the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR) and, following the 2013 Federal election, the Department of Education. For ease of reading, this report refers to DEEWR, unless otherwise noted. Under the Administrative Arrangements Order promulgated on 23 December 2014, the Department of Education became the Department of Education and Training, and early childhood programs were transferred to the Department of Social Services (DSS). The Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) and the Department of Finance were involved in the development of the EYQF and were also included in the audit. Overall conclusion The Early Years Quality Fund (EYQF) was created to assist in the attraction and retention of skilled and professional child care educators. In particular, the EYQF was intended to allow for increased wage rates for child care workers without these costs flowing on to families. The level of funding available, which was estimated to only cover around 30 per cent of all long day care workers, meant that there would be significant competition for available grants and the program would most likely be oversubscribed. In the event, the 300 million funding cap was reached less than 13 hours after the application process commenced. Successful implementation of policy initiatives requires early, informed and systematic consideration of implementation issues. The design of the EYQF policy contained inherent risks and it was foreseeable that these risks—particularly the funding constraints, the first-in first-served approach and the short timeframe—would affect access to the program and its ultimate success. While decisions on policy are a matter for government, departments are expected to provide frank, comprehensive and timely advice to Ministers on both policy design and implementation risks as part of the policy development process. This role was made somewhat more challenging for this program because many of the key elements of the EYQF policy were developed by advisers in the offices of the Prime Minister and Finance Minister in negotiation with the key stakeholder representing child care workers. The elements of the program were then settled through correspondence by key Ministers, rather than through the more conventional Cabinet processes. Advice was given to government at various stages in the design of the policy measure from several different departments. However, the development of the measure had some momentum and the advice provided by departments gained little traction. Nevertheless, there were gaps in departmental advice on a number of significant matters at different times. These included the inherent risk in the use of a demand‑driven grants application process and, at later stages, the accuracy of the proposed wage schedule and the potential impact on smaller child care providers of several of the advisory board recommendations. Following the then government’s decision to adopt the EYQF policy, DEEWR became responsible for the implementation of the program. The department was experienced in program implementation and promptly established arrangements to manage the grant process to meet the short timeframe set by the government for the commencement of the program. To some extent the development of key policy elements prior to any significant involvement of the department presented challenges to successful implementation, although in the event, key risks evident in the design of the policy were compounded by inadequacies in the department’s subsequent administration of the EYQF. Facilitating equitable access to the program by applicants was a significant risk to be managed throughout the program’s implementation, given the funds allocated by government were substantially less than required to cover the whole long day care sector. For the estimated 6000 long day care providers that were potential program applicants, accessibility to EYQF grants was also affected by limited consultation and public information about the EYQF grant process. While communication with the sector was initially intended to be managed by the EYQF advisory board, in practice the board’s ability to inform the sector was constrained by delays in its establishment. The board also resolved to amend its charter to emphasise its advisory role rather than its representation role. In this context it considered that it would have a limited role in communicating with the sector, although it agreed to publish post meeting communiques to provide a broad description of the decisions made at board meetings. The department’s own advice to the sector was very limited. Combined with the short timeframe set by the then government—two working days between the guidelines being released and the program applications opening—communication was not conducive to a first-in first‑served environment, where applicants needed to be poised to make business decisions and act quickly when applications opened. The department’s system for processing applications needed particular attention to preserve equity of access in the management of the first-in first‑served process. The email based system adopted by the department was not fit for purpose and did not fully maintain the first-in order of applications. Complexity and inconsistency within the grant guidelines also presented difficulties; applicants did not always follow the instructions in the guidelines and did not always submit complete applications. After identifying problems with the applications, the department varied the assessment process at several points while it was underway and also repeated a large number of assessments. Overall, while the department set about to achieve the timeframes expected by the then government, it did not demonstrate a disciplined approach to implementation that satisfied the requirements of the program and the Commonwealth Grant Guidelines (CGGs). As a result, EYQF processes and procedures were not as well developed as they should have been and there were risks that could have been better managed in the registration, application and approval processes, in the development of funding agreements, and in the management of stakeholder expectations. Further, significant decisions—made during the grant assessment process—were not fully considered or documented, which reduced transparency in relation to key assessment and funding decisions. At the completion of the grant assessment process, 453 grants (contained within approximately 580 submissions) were approved covering approximately 1309 child care services, and almost 24 000 employees. This represented around 30 per cent of long day care staff and 20 per cent of services. There were approximately 590 submissions not approved for grant funding. Noting that 554 submissions were received from small providers after the funding cap was reached. By close of business 6 September 2013, the day prior to the Federal election, funding agreements had been sent to 1 large provider, Goodstart Early Learning (for 132 million), and 15 small providers (for a total of 5 million) covering 11 710 employees. Subsequently, program changes have resulted in the 16 agreements being either varied or terminated. As at 30 June 2014, 62.5 million had been paid under EYQF. This audit report draws attention to the risks departments face in implementing grant programs, particularly in circumstances where requirements are largely determined by Ministers and their offices, and short timeframes are provided in which to develop and implement arrangements. Nevertheless, departments still have an important role in clearly drawing the attention of Ministers to implementation risks so as to reduce the likelihood of downstream problems affecting service delivery or equity of access to programs. Such advice is particularly important in programs like EYQF where funding was capped and risks of oversubscription were recognised. Key lessons arising from the implementation of the EYQF program include the importance of providing: frank, comprehensive and timely advice to Ministers in relation to implementation risks and opportunities for mitigating these risks where possible; keeping stakeholders informed of developments, including when programs reach full capacity; and ensuring that in demand‑driven grant programs, the program guidelines are followed to ensure, as far as possible, equity of access by applicants to available funds. A key step to achieving success in implementing policy on time, budget and to government’s expectations is to give consideration to implementation as a fundamental part of all stages of policy development. The audit has made one recommendation, observing that the EYQF program has been terminated and replaced with an alternative professional development program for child care educators. That said, the matters discussed in paragraph 24, together with the recommendation, are of relevance to other Commonwealth entities and are intended to inform the design and implementation of future programs

Administration of the Australian Apprenticeships Incentives Program

This audit assessed the effectiveness of the (former) Department of Industry’s administration of the Australian Apprenticeships Incentives Program. Audit objectives, criteria and scope The audit objective was to assess the effectiveness of Industry’s administration of the AAIP. To form a conclusion against the audit objective, the ANAO adopted the following high-level criteria: an effective governance framework for the AAIP has been implemented and Industry provided suitable guidance, processes and tools to support the AACs to effectively deliver AAIP services; suitable contractual arrangements, including sound contract management practices, were in place to support service delivery by the AACs and overall program management by Industry; and appropriate program management, performance monitoring and reporting structures were in place and used to inform the administration of the AAIP. The audit focussed on arrangements in place since 1 July 2012—the commencement of the current round of Support Services contracts. The ANAO examined relevant AAIP documentation, including a sample of contracts between the Australian Government and the AACs, and conducted interviews with key staff from Industry and a selection of AACs. The ANAO also analysed data from the Training and Youth Internet Management System (TYIMS). The audit did not examine the management of individual Australian Apprenticeships or of the AACs. In addition, the audit did not examine the procurement undertaken by the then DEEWR in 2011–12 to establish the current round of contracts, nor the procurement undertaken by Industry to establish the Support Network. The AAIP was previously audited by the ANAO in Audit Report No.9 2007–08, Australian Apprenticeships. That audit assessed the effectiveness of the former Department of Education, Science and Training\u27s (DEST) administration of its role in Australian Apprenticeships. The audit found that the program was appropriately used by employers, that financial assistance payments to employers were accurate, and that contract management practices were sound. The audit did however identify an opportunity to improve performance monitoring and evaluation activities and recommended (Recommendation No.2) that DEST: analyse program usage by employers of apprentices and trainees in occupations in national demand; and perform a sensitivity analysis of incentives payments to employers compared with Australian Apprenticeships completions. The current audit examined whether the two parts of the recommendation have been implemented. Overall conclusion Administered by the Department of Industry (Industry) at the time of the audit, the Australian Apprenticeships Incentives Program (AAIP) aims to contribute to the development of a highly skilled and relevant workforce by providing financial incentives to support employers and apprentices undertake Australian Apprenticeships. A key component of the program is the delivery of Australian Apprenticeships Support Services (Support Services) under contract by Australian Apprenticeships Centres (AACs). The current contract round commenced on 1 July 2012, and is scheduled to end on 30 June 2015. To the end of December 2014, total AAIP expenditure in the current contract round has been approximately 2.8 billion—comprising 2.3 billion in financial assistance grants and 0.5 billion in fees paid to the AACs. Overall, Industry’s administration of the AAIP in the current Support Services contract round was generally effective. Appropriate contract and program management arrangements were largely in place, and operating as intended. Notably, Industry’s processes for monitoring the performance of the contracted service providers (the AACs), including arrangements for assessing AACs’ compliance with contractual requirements, were soundly-based and well‑targeted. The majority of AACs were performing reasonably well against most performance measures, and over the two completed years of the current contract round, the combined total of reported employers and apprentices assisted by the AAIP has been in-line with Industry’s targets. Generally, AAIP payments made from 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2014 examined by the ANAO accorded with the program’s eligibility criteria and related policy conditions. Nonetheless, the audit highlighted some opportunities to further strengthen the AAIP’s management and oversight arrangements. This includes more regular data analysis to help assess the integrity of apprenticeship records and identify incorrect payments, and the development of a structured evaluation framework to help assess the program’s performance against its policy objective and intended outcomes. In the current contract round, Industry implemented relevant contract and program management arrangements and practices, which contributed to the overall effectiveness of the delivery of the AAIP and the Support Services. These arrangements included: fit-for-purpose contracts with the AACs, including clear service delivery requirements and performance measurement arrangements; a multi-faceted and well-targeted approach to monitoring the activities of the AACs, including assessing compliance against contractual requirements. A central part of these monitoring activities was a structured approach to assessing the validity of AACs’ eligibility assessments; generally well-designed risk management arrangements, including processes for assessing and managing the risks associated with fraud and conflicts of interest; and well-founded and instructive internal management reporting arrangements. Industry’s internal performance measurement and reporting arrangements provided departmental management with a range of useful and relevant information. In particular, the program’s performance measures included a useful mix of intermediate and proxy targets. However, these measures did not enable a complete assessment of the extent to which the AAIP is achieving its objective or intended outcomes. Further, Industry did not put in place an evaluation plan for the AAIP, and had not, at the time of the program’s transfer to Education and Training, conducted a formal evaluation of the effectiveness or performance of the AAIP during the current contract round. A program of structured evaluation activity would assist Education and Training to better assess the AAIP’s performance. The ANAO’s examination of AAIP-related records in the Training and Youth Internet Management System (TYIMS) identified shortcomings in record‑keeping arrangements, as well as some 960 incorrect financial assistance payments with a value of approximately 970 000. Although the incorrect payments identified are financially immaterial—representing less than 1 per cent of total program expenditure in the period 1 July 2012 to 30 June 2014—the results suggest that there would be benefit in regularising data analysis activities and upgrading data matching and validation functions. The ANAO has made one recommendation to Education and Training aimed at improving the evaluation framework for AAIP, noting that well‑designed monitoring and review arrangements can assist entities, and other interested stakeholders, make informed assessments about a program’s progress and relative contribution towards its intended outcomes and expected benefits

Delivery of the petrol sniffing strategy in remote Indigenous communities

This audit assessed the effectiveness of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet’s management of initiatives to supply low aromatic fuel to Indigenous communities. Overall conclusion Through the Petrol Sniffing Strategy (PSS), the Australian Government has supported initiatives to reduce the incidence and impact of petrol sniffing in remote Indigenous communities since 2005. The key element of the PSS is to subsidise the production of low aromatic fuel (LAF) so that it replaces regular unleaded petrol (RULP) in areas at risk of petrol sniffing outbreaks, without the higher production costs acting as a barrier to its uptake. While there are many underlying causes of petrol sniffing, generally associated with young people from disadvantaged backgrounds and marginalised groups, research results have indicated that the introduction of LAF has been successful in contributing to reductions in the incidence of petrol sniffing. For this reason, additional funding has been made available by the Australian Government to expand the supply and distribution of LAF. From an initial 41 sites in June 2005, the PSS expanded and, as at January 2015, LAF was available in 138 sites associated with 78 Indigenous communities in Western Australia, Queensland, South Australia and the Northern Territory. Consistent with the policy objective of the PSS, these sites are located in regional and remote areas of Australia. While the number of sites has increased, the overall annual volume of LAF produced has largely remained stable since 2007–08 with approximately 21 megalitres being produced on average each year. No performance targets have been set in relation to the volume of LAF produced and distributed, although contracts with LAF producers allow for an annual production of up to 53 megalitres. In the most recent expansion of the PSS in 2010–11, the Australian Government provided additional funding to include 39 sites covering 11 communities in Northern Australia, with an associated increase in annual volume of production of LAF. As well as supporting extra production capacity, a significant element of the increased funding was to provide for additional storage facilities as the lack of bulk storage had been identified as the key barrier to expanding the PSS in northern Australia. Following a select tender, the department responsible for providing LAF, the then Department of Health and Ageing (DoHA), entered into contracts with two major fuel producers to supply LAF to different regions of Australia. The development of additional storage infrastructure was initially included by DoHA in the tender for fuel production, however, the department subsequently chose to enter into direct negotiations with the operators of terminal facilities in Darwin. These negotiations were anticipated to have been completed in time to allow for facilities to be operational by 1 July 2012 which, in turn, would enable the contracts for increased production to commence. Negotiations were lengthy and remained ongoing at the time the responsibility for petrol sniffing initiatives was transferred to the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) in September 2013. An agreement for capital works was subsequently executed in December 2013, which enabled work to commence on developing the required storage infrastructure. The storage facility became operational in November 2014, more than two years later than expected. As a result of the delay, implementation of the expansion fell short of the Government’s initial expectations. The facility was also more expensive than first anticipated, with the contracted cost of establishing the bulk storage facility being up to 19.2 million (including GST)—exceeding significantly the initial estimates of up to 12.9 million. Following the establishment of storage facilities, additional production of LAF commenced in late November 2014 and PM&C anticipates that the annual volume of LAF produced in 2015–16 will double. The department’s processes for managing existing contractual arrangements and for monitoring the delivery of LAF are largely sound. Information collected under the production and distribution agreements enables PM&C to maintain appropriate visibility over the volume of LAF supplied and the locations of sites to which it is supplied. The main approach of the PSS is to reduce the availability of RULP in high risk communities by encouraging fuel outlets serving those communities and outlets in surrounding areas to only stock LAF and create a distance buffer zone around vulnerable communities. Accordingly, PM&C monitors supply information so that sites ceasing to supply LAF can be contacted and encouraged to continue to participate in the PSS. In addition, since 2005, a contracted research provider has assessed a sample of communities periodically for incidences of petrol sniffing and the role of LAF in reducing outbreaks. As a result of these data collection arrangements, PM&C has a reasonable evidence base to support the assessment of LAF in reducing the incidence of petrol sniffing. Between 2005 and 2009, the supply of LAF was identified as a program in the Health and Ageing Portfolio Budget Statements, and DoHA reported against the number of sites providing LAF as an indicator of performance for the PSS. Between 2009 and 2014 there was no formal reporting on the progress of the strategy. While the PSS has expanded, albeit more slowly than anticipated, there has been little information publicly reported on the effect that the supply of LAF has had on reducing the incidence of petrol sniffing in Indigenous communities. Research indicates that the supply of LAF is making a positive contribution to reducing petrol sniffing. The design of the PSS, however, also acknowledges that there are limitations to taking a single approach and that other actions need to be undertaken in conjunction with the supply of LAF to successfully address the issue of petrol sniffing. In 2014, the PSS was identified in the Prime Minister and Cabinet Portfolio Budget Statements as a specific initiative to be delivered under the Safety and Wellbeing Programme, with the key performance indicator being the number of sites providing LAF. Using this narrowly-focussed indicator alone, however, will provide for only a limited assessment of performance. In view of the PSS’s maturity, it is timely for PM&C to strengthen its PSS-related performance reporting by including a greater focus on assessing the impact of the PSS. The ANAO has made one recommendation to improve PM&C’s accountability and reporting for the PSS

Confidentiality in government contracts: senate order for departmental and entity contracts (calendar year 2014 compliance)

Audit objectives and scope The objective of the audit was to assess the appropriateness of the use and reporting of confidentiality provisions in a sample of Australian Government contracts. The criteria were: entities published contract listings on their websites and Ministers’ letters were tabled in accordance with the content and timing requirements of the Order; confidentiality provisions were used appropriately in a sample of contracts which were reported to contain confidentiality provisions by the selected entities; and the selected entities accurately reported contract information, including the use of confidentiality provisions, in the contract listings and on AusTender. The selected entities for the audit were: Department of Finance (Finance); Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C); Department of Social Services (DSS); and Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA). The sample of contracts was taken from the selected entities’ Senate Order listings for the 2014 calendar year and AusTender. Two entities DSS and PM&C had significant machinery of government changes during 2014. Overall conclusion The Senate Order was introduced to improve public access to information about government contracting. The results of this audit indicate that while the reported use of confidentiality provisions is low, entities’ reporting practices are not always adequate or reliable enough to meet the requirements of the Order. Transparency of contract information can be affected as a result. The 2014 Senate Order listings contained 41 469 contracts for goods and services totalling 216.3 billion, of which 1 855 contracts (4.5 per cent) valued at 30.1 billion (13.9%), were reported as containing confidentiality provisions. The reported use of confidentiality provisions by entities was in keeping with 2013 levels, and continues to reflect a significant decline from the 24 per cent of contracts reported in 2001, the year the Order was introduced. Entities are expected to support their Ministers to comply with the Senate Order though publishing contract listings in accordance with content and timing requirements. This audit found that entities did not always meet these requirements and Ministers could be better supported through entities publishing lists by the due date and verifying that contract details are accurately reported. In this respect in 2014, the ANAO observed: overall entity performance in meeting the content requirements of the Order had declined in comparison to 2013—only 24 per cent of entities were fully compliant; for the four entities examined in detail by the ANAO, none of the contract listings fully complied with the Order’s publishing requirements. The main reason for non-compliance was the reporting of contracts outside the relevant contract period; and a small number of entity listings (15 per cent) were published late (within one month of the due date), and as at 30 June 2015 one entity, had not published a listing or a notice that no relevant contracts had been entered into. Despite the low proportion of contracts reported as containing confidentiality provisions, specific confidentiality provisions in contracts continue to be incorrectly used and reported in 2014. The ANAO’s examination of a sample of 101 contracts reported to contain confidentiality provisions, found that for 80 per cent of the contracts the use of confidentiality provisions did not comply with the Guidance or was misreported. The level of inappropriate use has increased by 17 per cent compared to the 2013 Senate Order compliance audit. Confidentiality provisions in government contracts can impede accountability and transparency in government purchasing. A request for specific information to be kept confidential must be assessed against the Confidentiality Test criteria and entities should make sure decisions to include confidentiality provisions are documented. In this respect, the audited entities were not able to provide documentation supporting their assessment of suppliers’ claims against the Confidentiality Test, and reasons for agreeing for the information to remain confidential. The results of this audit indicate that processes to capture information about basic contract details and the reporting of existence of confidentiality provisions needs to improve. Entities currently must report on procurement contracts for the purposes of the Senate Order and separately on AusTender to meet requirements of the Commonwealth Procurement Rules. Of the 2 171 procurement contracts listed in the audited entities’ Senate Order listings, 1 936 (89 per cent) had a corresponding entry in AusTende In the ANAO’s sample only 17 per cent of contracts were found to be accurately reported, taking into account the basic contract information and the correct type and reason for confidentiality provisions. The ANAO has previously observed shortcomings both in the application of the Confidentiality Test and in the accuracy of Senate Order and AusTender reporting. The results of this audit show that there continues to be scope for entities to improve their assessment of suppliers’ claims for confidentiality of contractual information and implement more rigorous quality assurance processes for reporting confidentiality provisions in contracts. The Department of Finance supports entities to comply with the Senate Order through providing whole-of-government procurement guidance and communicating the key requirements of the Order. Opportunities exist for Finance to improve advice through direct reference to the Confidentiality Test in the Commonwealth Procurement Rules, and disseminating better practice examples of entity assurance mechanisms. The ANAO has made three recommendations to assist improving the use and reporting of confidentiality provisions

Procurement initiatives to support outcomes for Indigenous Australians

This audit assessed the effectiveness of the administration of procurement initiatives to support opportunities for Indigenous Australians. Audit objective, criteria and scope The objective of the audit was to assess the effectiveness of the administration of procurement initiatives to support opportunities for Indigenous Australians. To conclude against this objective the ANAO adopted high-level criteria which considered the effectiveness of the administration by PM&C and Finance of the IOP and IBE respectively. The criteria also considered the application of these policies by selected entities and the overall monitoring and reporting of outcomes achieved. The scope of the audit included: the application of the IOP since 2011 by selected Australian Government entities and its overall administration by PM&C, and formerly by the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR); and the use of the exemption for Indigenous businesses in the CPRs by selected Australian Government entities and the administration of the exemption by Finance since 2011. The application of the IOP and the IBE was examined in the following entities: Department of Defence (Defence); Australian Taxation Office (ATO); Department of Human Services (DHS); Department of Employment (Employment); Department of Industry and Science (Industry); and Department of Education and Training. The ANAO also considered aspects of the Indigenous Procurement Policy which commenced from 1 July 2015, insofar as the experience of the IOP and IBE is relevant to its implementation. Overall conclusion Procurement Connected Policies (PCPs) to improve Indigenous economic outcomes have been used in various forms by the Australian Government since 1998. Through the Indigenous Opportunities Policy (IOP) and the Indigenous Business Exemption (IBE), a two-tiered approach was developed that sought to increase Indigenous involvement in the government supply chain, both directly as suppliers and indirectly through training and employment opportunities. Indigenous organisations have generally played a significant part in the delivery of government services funded through grant programs but the participation of Indigenous businesses in government procurement has remained very low. Overall, while the policy intent to leverage better Indigenous outcomes from Australian Government procurement activity has been clear, the frameworks developed by entities to achieve the objectives have not generally facilitated effective delivery of the outcomes sought. Key factors in this respect include the geographical limitations placed on the application of the IOP, the absence of any requirement for procuring entities to drive or monitor outcomes including those resulting from either their own or their suppliers actions, and the voluntary reporting requirements placed on entities which have hindered the ability of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C) and the Department of Finance (Finance) to analyse activity and provide advice to government. A number of these issues are being addressed in the development of the new policy arrangements from 1 July 2015, although achieving the intended policy outcomes is likely to require continued efforts by government entities. In developing the IOP framework, a significant population was defined as being one where the proportion of the Indigenous population of a region was equal to or higher than the national average. This relative approach, however, had the effect of excluding areas, particularly urban areas, where there were significant Indigenous populations in absolute rather than relative terms. As a result, the geographic regions where the IOP applied until June 2015 included only 73 per cent of the total Indigenous population and did not generally include urban and some regional areas where economic activity was likely to be higher and more diverse. The geographic requirements of the IOP also provided practical challenges to its application by entities. Entities were required to determine whether contracts over certain values should have been identified as being subject to the IOP based on the physical location of the main contract activity. IOP regions were determined and publicised by PM&C, and it provided guidelines for entities and businesses. However, in cases where contracted activity occurred in multiple locations, including in both IOP and non-IOP regions, the interpretation of the requirements was not always straightforward and implementation by the entities included as part of this audit was not always consistent. More broadly, the data systems of audited entities often did not sufficiently capture the geographical locations where the main contracted activity was to take place and generally a limited record was maintained of decisions in relation to whether the IOP should be applied to particular approaches to market. In order to minimise the additional workload on procuring entities arising from the introduction of the IOP, entities were required only to take steps to ensure that a supplier has an approved IOP plan in place prior to issuing a contract. These plans were to provide details of the suppliers’ commitments in relation to Indigenous employment, training and business opportunity. Suppliers were required to implement these commitments if awarded a contract. Entities, however, were not required to include any of the supplier’s commitments under the plan into the contract nor to monitor the implementation of any of those commitments as part of managing the contracts. Instead, PM&C—and prior to that the Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations (DEEWR)—had the responsibility to monitor that entities are appropriately identifying contracts to which the IOP applied and to receive the required reports from suppliers about the implementation of their IOP plans. While PM&C, and previously DEEWR, made appropriate efforts to fulfil this responsibility, the voluntary nature of entity reporting and data limitations, where the geographical location of contracts is not recorded in the government’s procurement database (AusTender), means that relevant information upon which to assess implementation was not easily accessible. As a result PM&C was not well positioned to advise government on the extent that the IOP contributed to the desired objective of creating economic opportunities for Indigenous Australians, or on the extent that Australian Government entities were appropriately implementing the IOP. To complement the IOP and improve direct access for Indigenous business as suppliers to government, the Indigenous Business Exemption (IBE) allows entities to conduct streamlined procurement processes with Indigenous businesses within the Commonwealth Procurement Rules (CPRs). Although the IBE has been available under the procurement framework since 2011, use of the IBE was low in the entities examined by the ANAO and there is no aggregated reporting by Finance on the use of the exemption by Australian Government entities. Based on available data, the involvement of Indigenous businesses in government purchasing is very limited. Since 2011, 120 contracts with Indigenous businesses certified through Supply Nation have been listed on AusTender. Of these, only 17 were listed as limited tender procurements over the relevant financial threshold and where the exemption may have been applied. Using the IBE requires procurement officers to consider choosing a procurement method on the basis of the indigeneity of the supplier and, at times, with limited information on the strength and distribution of the Indigenous supplier market. These decisions are required early in the procurement process and require entity staff to assess the value for money represented by an Indigenous business proposal in the absence of a competitive assessment process, requiring other information to be sought in order to make an assessment of value for money. While the IBE may shorten the timeframes of some procurements by removing the need for an open tender process to occur, the additional steps (scanning the market for suitable Indigenous supplier(s) and approaching them for a quote) and decisions (assessing the value for money offering of a supplier in the absence of an open approach to market) outside of the more commonly used procedures, may also be contributing to the low levels of application of the IBE. Some Indigenous businesses interviewed by the ANAO reported that use of the IBE was generally only considered by entity staff when support for its use was advocated by a sufficiently senior officer of the entity, and that committed leadership was a key element present in the cases when their approaches to entities resulted in the use of the IBE. However, Indigenous businesses reported that in most cases, their approaches to entities did not result in the use of the IBE being actively considered as a procurement method. From 1 July 2015, Australian Government portfolios are required to report performance against agreed targets for the level of contracting with Indigenous business, and to set aside some contracts for which Indigenous businesses will be approached, on a value for money basis, prior to any approach to the open market. Based on current performance, both in terms of the low level of entity use of Indigenous suppliers and in terms of oversight, monitoring and reporting arrangements, successful implementation of these new policy requirements will need increased promotion and support. The Indigenous Procurement Policy (IPP) introduces flexibility in the way entities can approach their targets including by: setting them at portfolio levels; allowing sub-contracting opportunities to be included; applying a formula to enable the conversion of the target from number of contracts by volume to a target by contract values; and including contracts with Joint Ventures which have at least 25 per cent Indigenous equity. Nonetheless, the targets are ambitious. There are risks in seeking to move quickly to meet the new targets and entities will need to be vigilant to ensure that the requirements of the procurement framework, including achieving procurement outcomes economically and efficiently, continue to be met in addition to meeting the targets. While the IPP is the overarching framework in relation to Indigenous procurement policy, some elements of the IOP have remained, including the use of geographically-defined areas. In view of the experience of entities to date there would be merit in PM&C further reviewing the approach to determine the conditions under which the proposed minimum Indigenous participation requirements may be most effectively applied, particularly those relating to the use of Indigenous businesses by government suppliers. The ANAO has made three recommendations to assist PM&C and Finance to better implement, monitor and report on initiatives seeking to increase opportunities for Indigenous Australians through government procurement

Regulation of Great Barrier Reef Marine Park permits and approvals

Audit objective and criteria The objective of this audit was to assess the effectiveness of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority’s regulation of permits and approvals within the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park. To form a conclusion against this objective, the ANAO adopted the following high-level criteria: an effective process to assess permit applications and attach enforceable conditions has been established; a structured risk management framework to assess and manage compliance risks has been implemented; an effective risk-based compliance program to communicate regulatory requirements and to monitor compliance with permit conditions and regulatory objectives has been implemented; and arrangements to manage non-compliance are effective. The ANAO examined GBRMPA’s assessment of Marine Park permit applications, monitoring of permit holders’ compliance and response to permit holders’ non-compliance. The ANAO did not examine GBRMPA’s other regulatory activities, such as the FMCU’s investigation and enforcement activities associated with: activities not subject to a permit; the state marine park; or permits and licenses granted under state legislation. Overall conclusion GBRMPA assesses approximately 400 permit applications each year and, at any one time, GBRMPA and its partner agencies under the Joint Field Management Program are responsible for monitoring the compliance of approximately 1300 permit holders with their permit conditions and taking appropriate enforcement action in response to identified non-compliance. Over the period July 2012 to June 2014, GBRMPA assessed 76 reported breaches of Marine Park permit conditions (approximately five per cent of all recorded breach incidents) and conducted 59 investigations. In relation to the regulation of permits, identified shortcomings in GBRMPA’s regulatory processes and, more particularly, its regulatory practices have undermined the effectiveness of the permitting system as a means of managing risks to the Marine Park. These shortcomings were identified across a broad range of GBRMPA’s regulatory activities, including its assessment of permit applications, monitoring of permit holder compliance and response to non-compliance. While GBRMPA has well-established arrangements for processing and assessing permit applications, there were weaknesses in the quality and completeness of the assessments undertaken against regulatory requirements. The causes of these weaknesses included fragmented and incomplete guidance material for staff, incomplete records, insufficient consideration of relevant assessment requirements and limited assurance from quality control processes. As a consequence, the permit application assessment reports prepared for the delegate did not address all regulatory requirements on which decisions to issue or refuse permits were to be based. Delegates did, however, generally document their decisions to issue or refuse permits in an appropriate manner, including the reasons underpinning the decisions, after considering the permit application assessment reports and proposed conditions to be attached to issued permits. These conditions, which are the primary means by which GBRMPA mitigates the risks posed to the reef by proposed activities, generally addressed many of the high or medium-rated risks identified during the assessment process. GBRMPA should, however, periodically review the design of standard permit conditions that it applies to common permit types to help ensure that they effectively address significant risks to the Marine Park. In general, permit monitoring undertaken collectively by GBRMPA and its partner agencies has been insufficient to determine permit holders’ compliance with permit conditions. Specifically, GBRMPA was not effectively monitoring the timely receipt of most post-approval reporting documentation that permit holders were required to submit under their permit conditions, nor appropriately documenting its assessment/approval of the post‑approval reports submitted. While intelligence and risk-based field compliance operations (primarily vessel, aerial and land-based patrols) undertaken by GBRMPA and its partners agencies are effective in detecting some forms of permit-related non-compliance, they are not well-suited to detecting other forms of non-compliance (such as the condition of sub-surface infrastructure). The limited additional monitoring of permit compliance that has been undertaken by GBRMPA to supplement existing patrols (including site inspections), was not, however, informed by an appropriate risk-based approach. The failure to effectively monitor permit holder reporting requirements and to undertake sufficient risk-based supplementary monitoring activities reduces the effectiveness of permit conditions as a means of managing risks to the Marine Park from permitted activities. Until recently, many instances of permit holder non-compliance (mostly related to the provision of required documentation) were not identified by GBRMPA staff and not recorded centrally for assessment and possible enforcement action. These shortcomings in recording permit non‑compliance have adversely impacted on GBRMPA’s ability to develop an informed view of the extent of permit non-compliance and address areas of non‑compliance in a timely manner. The limited guidance for investigators when determining appropriate enforcement responses to non-compliance, when coupled with poorly documented reasons for enforcement actions, also makes it difficult for GBRMPA to demonstrate the basis for its enforcement decision-making. GBRMPA has acknowledged weaknesses in its permit assessment and compliance management processes and practices and has commenced work on a number of initiatives to strengthen existing arrangements. As part of this work, a high-level risk assessment of permitted activities in the Marine Park, which was prepared by GBRMPA in late 2014, indicated that existing controls (primarily permit conditions, deeds and bonds, intelligence gathering and analysis, patrols, and other monitoring activities) are generally insufficient to detect non-compliance with permit conditions. GBRMPA informed the ANAO that the permit compliance management plan, currently under development, will outline strategies to better address risks to the Marine Park environment from permitted activities and permit holders. To improve GBRMPA’s regulation of Marine Park permits and to inform the work being undertaken to enhance compliance management practices, the ANAO has made five recommendations to strengthen the: processing of permit applications; rigour of the permit application assessment and decision-making processes; effectiveness of permit conditions; effectiveness of permit compliance monitoring; and response to instances of non-compliance

Administration of the Australian Childhood Immunisation Register

This audit examined the effectiveness of the Department of Human Services’ administration of the Australian Childhood Immunisation Register. Audit objective, criteria and scope The audit objective was to examine the effectiveness of the Department of Human Services’ (Human Services) administration of the Australian Childhood Immunisation Register (ACIR). To form a conclusion against the objective, the ANAO adopted the following high-level criteria: Human Services has established effective policies and procedures to support the administration of ACIR; Human Services has adequate procedures and controls in place for the collection, use and management of ACIR information, including to maintain the integrity of data in ACIR; and Human Services has sound reporting processes which support the timely, accurate and authorised dissemination of ACIR information. The audit focused on Human Services’ administration of ACIR and did not include an assessment of the broader National Immunisation Program or its overall administration by the Department of Health. ACIR is largely populated using data from the Medicare customer database, which was the subject of a previous ANAO performance audit. The integrity of the Medicare customer database has not been examined again as part of the current audit. However, where relevant, the findings of the previous audit are noted in this report. Overall conclusion The Australian Childhood Immunisation Register (ACIR or the Register) records the immunisation details for over 2.25 million children under the age of seven. The Register is a key public health resource used to measure and monitor immunisation coverage rates for policy and planning purposes, and to inform parents and immunisation providers of a child’s immunisation status. Information from the Register is also used to confirm a parent’s eligibility for certain family assistance payments as part of an Australian Government policy to encourage childhood immunisation, as well as for authorised research purposes. The Department of Health (Health) has responsibility for the overall management of ACIR in the context of the National Immunisation Program (NIP) agreed by Australian Governments, while the Department of Human Services (Human Services) is responsible for establishing and maintaining ACIR. A business agreement between the departments documents key aspects of Human Services’ day-to-day administration of the Register. The ACIR contributes to the overall success of the NIP and the health status of individual children, and in April 2015 the Australian Government announced its intention to also establish an Australian School Vaccination Register for adolescents. Australian governments use data from the current Register to inform immunisation policy and planning including, most recently, a policy response to growing levels of conscientious objections to immunisation. Parents and immunisation providers have also come to rely on the Register as a source of information on the immunisation status of children under seven years of age, including for the administration of essential vaccines in accordance with the NIP schedule. Children will generally receive vaccinations for different diseases over a number of years, potentially from different providers, and a key challenge for Human Services is to maintain the Register’s integrity through accurate and timely data entry and revision. In its administration of ACIR, Human Services relies on information received from parents and providers, and on the reliable exchange of data between ACIR and other departmental ICT systems—the Medicare Consumer Directory (MCD) and the Centrelink program’s Income Security Integrated System (ISIS). Overall, Human Services’ administration of ACIR has been generally effective. The department has generally met or exceeded performance targets established in its business agreement with Health, and maintains a range of communication channels to facilitate parents’ and immunisation providers’ access to child immunisation records. System controls to maintain the integrity of data on the Register have been implemented and are generally operating as intended, although there remains scope to strengthen the ACIR quality and control framework. In particular, known impediments to the automated exchange of information between ACIR and other departmental ICT systems mean that the department must manually reconcile certain records on a daily basis—an ongoing administrative overhead. Further, while information on the Register can be added or revised on the basis of telephone advice received from immunisation providers, there is no process for monitoring ACIR telephony services for quality control purposes; and the department has not clearly communicated its expectations on the key role played by parents and immunisation providers in maintaining the integrity of ACIR data holdings. Between 2011–12 and 2013–14, the ANAO’s analysis of Human Services’ documentation indicated that the department generally met or exceeded the ACIR performance targets set out in its Business Agreement with Health. During this period, the department provided 100 per cent of financial reports to stakeholders within five working days of the specified time, exceeding its target of 90 per cent. The department also exceeded its target of making 90 per cent of immunisation provider payments within seven days before the end of the month, with 100 per cent of payments made within the required timeframe. In 2013–14, some 92.5 per cent of immunisation information was processed within 10 working days, against a target of 95 per cent. Human Services has also established a number of useful communication channels for stakeholders, including a dedicated website and telephone lines, and outreach officers for Indigenous and multicultural customers. The Register is a key public health information resource, and effective communication channels facilitate parental access to their child’s Immunisation History Statement (IHS) and enable immunisation providers to interrogate ACIR regarding their patients’ immunisation status. However, maintaining ACIR data quality remains an ongoing business risk for the department. Limited interoperability between Human Services’ ICT systems (ACIR, MCD and ISIS) and external providers’ practice management software (PMS) makes it necessary for the department to supplement automated data exchange processes with daily manual data cleansing and matching activities. For instance, departmental operational reports of transactions between ACIR and MCD indicate that some 4 900 records required manual resolution over a two month period. Many electronic transactions between ACIR and immunisation providers also required manual investigation during this period, as did transactions between ACIR and ISIS. To contribute to ACIR data integrity and improve the efficiency of information processing, Human Services should establish a pathway for the resolution of persistent and known data synchronisation issues between ACIR and other departmental ICT systems, incorporating a planned process and timetable. There would also be benefit in the department working with PMS suppliers to identify options for addressing errors arising during data exchanges between the ACIR and provider systems. The department relies on the experience of its Service Officers (SOs), supported by documented procedures, to maintain the quality of its manual reconciliation processes. However, there is currently no systematic quality control process in place to provide departmental management with additional assurance regarding the accuracy of these resource-intensive manual processes. There would be merit in the department introducing a quality control framework for manual reconciliation and review processes applying to data exchanged between ACIR and other ICT systems. Similarly, no quality control process applies to ACIR telephone calls from parents and immunisation providers, which can result in updates to information kept on the Register. Consistent with many other services provided by Human Services, the department should also apply quality call listening processes to ACIR-related telephone calls, to provide additional assurance that the Register is updated in accordance with relevant procedures. Human Services advised the ANAO that in addition to its own quality control processes, it relies on parents and immunisation providers to assist in maintaining the accuracy of the Register. In particular, the department expects that parents will check that details recorded on their child’s IHS are correct, and will advise the department of any errors. The department also expects that immunisation providers will review their monthly payment summaries to check that vaccines they administered have been accurately recorded, and that payments made to them are correct. However, Human Services’ expectations in respect to maintaining the accuracy of the Register are not clearly and consistently communicated to parents and providers, and the department should include a statement to this effect in relevant communication materials, including the IHS sent to parents and the monthly payment summaries sent to providers. The ANAO has made three recommendations to strengthen the ACIR quality and control framework, focusing on Human Services: establishing a pathway to resolve known impediments to the automated exchange of information between ACIR and other departmental ICT systems; introducing a process to monitor the quality of ACIR telephony services and manual data reconciliation activities on a sample basis; and clearly conveying departmental expectations relating to the role played by parents and immunisation providers in maintaining the accuracy of the Register. As mentioned, the current Register contributes to the overall success of the NIP, and informs ongoing policy responses to immunisation issues—such as the $26 million 2015–16 Budget measure foreshadowed by the Australian Government in April 2015. As part of that measure, the Government proposes to establish an Australian School Vaccination Register for adolescents. The findings and recommendations of this audit of ACIR may also inform responsible entities in the implementation and operation of the proposed school vaccination register

Administration of the Indigenous Legal Assistance Programme

This audit assessed the effectiveness of the Attorney‐General’s Department’s administration of the Indigenous Legal Assistance Programme. Audit objectives and criteria The objective of the audit was to assess the effectiveness of the Attorney-General’s Department’s administration of the Indigenous Legal Assistance Programme. To conclude on this objective the ANAO adopted high level criteria relating to the effectiveness of program management arrangements, AGD’s management of funding agreements, performance monitoring and reporting arrangements. Overall conclusion Access to appropriate legal assistance services is an important element of a fair and equitable legal system. Since 2011, funding through the Indigenous Legal Assistance Programme (ILAP) has enabled service providers to deliver a cumulative total of 604 519 legal assistance services, or an average of 201 506 per year. Over the same period, ILAP funding has enabled these service providers to operate an average of 84 outlets each year to provide services. Research undertaken by a range of government and non-government bodies indicates generally that the level of unmet demand for Indigenous legal assistance services is higher than the supply of those same services. Additionally, the Productivity Commission has reported in the 2014 Overcoming Indigenous Disadvantage report that between 2000 and 2013, Indigenous imprisonment rates have continued to worsen with the imprisonment rate for Indigenous adults increasing by 57.4 per cent. There have also been significant increases in juvenile detention rates since 2001. While these trends in themselves are not necessarily reflective of levels of access and the quality of services provided through ILAP, they do indicate that demand for Indigenous legal assistance services is high and is likely to remain so. Facilitating appropriate access to justice is complex and involves a number of different institutions. For the most part, Australians interact with the justice system at the state and territory level, and accessibility is largely determined by how that justice system functions. As a result, while Australian Government support through ILAP is able to address some barriers to access, it is not able to address all factors relevant to improving access to justice for Indigenous people. Further, the demand for services arises largely from the operation of state and territory laws. In this respect, demand for Indigenous legal assistance services is not in the control of the Australian Government and can be affected significantly by changes made to state and territory laws. In this context, and considering the small size of the program, the overall management approach taken by the Attorney-General’s Department (AGD) is reasonable. The approach recognises that there are institutional and jurisdictional differences in justice systems across Australia, and acknowledges that ILAP service providers are better placed than AGD to identify appropriate service approaches in the areas they service. Accordingly, AGD allows service providers flexibility in their planning and delivery approach. In circumstances where national programs allow for local flexibility, program management arrangements need to be designed to achieve appropriate levels of consistency. Performance information arrangements also need to be well developed to enable appropriate comparative analysis and assessment of program performance overall. AGD has put in place a range of approaches to promote consistent national management of ILAP. These include a formula based funding allocation model that incorporates information specific to each jurisdiction, but assesses each jurisdiction against the same criteria and weightings to determine the funding levels to be allocated to each service provider. Expectations in relation to service delivery are promoted by the Service Delivery Directions, made available to service providers to inform the annual development of service plans, and the development of the Indigenous Quality Practice Portal designed to support the collection and analysis of relevant performance information and monitor delivery against Service Standards. Grant funding is managed through standard funding agreements that are in place with each service provider. AGD’s management of ILAP has matured since it assumed responsibility for the program in 2004, and while the current management framework is reasonable overall, improvements can be made in the following areas. Firstly, to give better effect to the intent of the program to prioritise assistance to communities with the highest need, the funding allocation model, which is currently being revised by AGD, could be enhanced by the inclusion of additional social and economic indicators of disadvantage to better target available resources. Secondly, there would be benefit in developing greater consistency in relation to performance expectations. Currently, each ILAP service provider proposes targets for the number of services they expect to provide in their annual service plans, which are endorsed by AGD as part of the annual planning process. However, the definition of a service can vary between jurisdiction and AGD has not developed a benchmark level of service against which an assessment of proposed targets can be made. Further, service plans are not integrated into funding agreements, and as a result, there is no clear link between the funding amounts provided in the agreements and the expected level of performance. Generally, ILAP funding agreements are compliance focussed and show only a limited performance orientation. While the reporting requirements established in the funding agreements give AGD sufficient visibility to identify issues of compliance, AGD has not always been timely in verifying or addressing matters relating to service provider compliance. Further, the focus of AGD’s program measurement and reporting is mainly on the levels of funding expended and the number of legal services delivered. This information is relevant in view of the demand-driven nature of ILAP. However, in the absence of targets or baseline information in relation to access, AGD is unable to assess whether access to justice has improved as a result of ILAP funding. Improvements to the collection, reporting and use of currently available performance information—directed towards measuring and reporting on the quality of services delivered and supported by appropriate assurance and verification mechanisms—would better enable AGD to strengthen its focus on whether the program is performing in line with expectations, and that barriers to access are being appropriately addressed. The ANAO has made one recommendation aimed at improving AGD’s approach to setting and assessing performance targets